Exploit contagionEthereum, past incidentContagion
Kelp DAO rsETH
18 April 2026. A forged bridge message released rsETH, and the attacker borrowed against it.
78 min
ahead of the lenders' rush
- 2026-04-18 17:35 UTC: Stolen rsETH arrives
- 2026-04-18 17:42 UTC: NOCK pulls you out
- 2026-04-18 19:00 UTC: Lenders rush out, markets freeze
| Time | What happened | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| 17:35 | Stolen rsETH lands in a fresh wallet | $294.4M |
| 17:42 | A quarter of it is now collateral on Aave and Compound | $128.9M |
| 17:42 | NOCK calls exit() on your guard | to you |
| 19:00 | The big lenders rush out | $685.6M |
- 78 min
- ahead of the lenders' rush
- $213.2M
- posted as collateral in 15 minutes
- $685.6M
- lenders pulled in one hour
- $190.0M
- bad debt left, as reported
AThe evidence
Powered by Nansen APIThe evidence
- Arrival
- $294.4M via lzReceive, into a wallet with no Nansen label
- Spread across
- 13 more wallets inside the window
- Collateral posted
- Compound WETH (cWETHv3) $2.5M at 17:39
- Aave rsETH (aEthrsETH) $12.6M at 17:40
- Aave rsETH (aEthrsETH) $50.5M at 17:41
- Compound WETH (cWETHv3) $63.2M at 17:42
- Aave rsETH (aEthrsETH) $70.7M at 17:43
- Compound wstETH (cWstETHv3) $12.6M at 17:49
- Aave rsETH (aEthrsETH) $1.0M at 17:50
- The detector
- contagion when 25% of an unexplained $50M arrival becomes collateral within 15 minutes
Source: Nansen API, tgm/transfers. Captured 2026-09-24 03:20 UTC, recomputed on every view by the detector the watch runs. These thresholds were set on this one case; they are a starting point, not a promise.
BMore cases